This paper provides a framework for information assurance within collaborative design based on a technique we call rolebased viewing. Role-based viewing enables role-based access control through geometric partitioning of 3D models. The partitioning is used to create variable level-of-detail (LOD) meshes, across both individual parts and assemblies, to provide a model suitable for access rights for individual actors within a collaborative design environment.
Introduction
Information assurance (IA) refers to methodologies to protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. In collaborative design, IA is mission-critical. Suppose a team of designers is working collaboratively on a 3D assembly model. Each designer has a different set of security privileges and no one on the team has the "need to know" the details of the entire design. In collaboration, designers must interface with others' components/sub-assemblies, but do so in a way that provides each designer with only the level of information he or she is permitted to have about each of the components.
For example, one may need to know the exact shape of some portion of the part (including mating features) being created by another designer, but not the specifics of any other aspects of the part. Such a need can also be found when manufacturers outsource designing a sub-system: manufacturers may want to hide some critical information of the entire system from suppliers.
The authors believe that a geometric approach to IA represents a new problem that needs to be addressed in the development of collaborative CAD systems. The approach we develop has many uses visible across several significant scenarios we envision for applying this work:
This paper develops a new technique for role-based viewing in a collaborative 3D assembly design environment, where multiple users work simultaneously over the network, and presents a combination of multiresolution geometry and security models. Among various issues in IA, access control is critical for the purpose. We demonstrate the specification of access privileges to geometric partitions in 3D assembly models defined based on the Bell-La Padula model. In our method, the partitioning is used to create variable level-of-detail (LOD) meshes, across both individual parts and assemblies, to provide a view dependent model suitable for a user with a given level of security clearance. We achieve these functional capabilities within a system designed for secure, real-time collaborative viewing of 3D models by multiple users working synchronously over the internet on standard graphics workstations. Aside from digital 3D watermarking, research on how to provide IA to distributed engineering teams, working in collaborative graphical environments, is largely nonexistent. The authors believe that this work represents a unique application of IA to computer-aided design and collaborative engineering.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes related work from information assurance, collaborative design, and computer graphics communities. Section 3 presents a specification of security features in the fields of solid modeling and engineering. Section 4 explains the details of our multiresolution security model. Section 5 describes the implementation of our prototype system, and demonstrates a sample scenario using our approach. Lastly, Section 6 summarizes our results, presents our conclusions, and outlines goals for future research.
Related Work

Information Assurance and Security
Current research on information assurance incorporates a broad range of areas focused on protecting information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, confidentiality, non-repudiation, authentication, and controlling modes of access. Information assurance research, in the context of the CAD domain, has been partially addressed by the computer graphics community through the development of 3D digital watermarking [Praun et al., 1999] . Digital Watermarking is used to ensure that the integrity of a model has been maintained, as well as provide a foundation for proof of copyright infringement. Other areas of research have been in authentication and accesscontrol. We will introduce past and present research on access control methodologies and outline the differences between the varying policies.
There is a clear distinction between authentication and access control services. Authentication services are used to correctly determine the identity of a user. Access control is the process of limiting access to resources of a system only to authorized users, programs, processes, or other systems. Authentication is closely coupled with access control, where access control assumes that users of an information system have properly been identified by the system. If the authentication mechanism of a system has been compromised, then the access control mechanism that follows will certainly be compromised. The primary focus of our work is to articulate an access control policy, specifically for the geometry of a solid model, assuming a robust authentication mechanism has already been established. Accesscontrol literature describes high-level policies on how accesses are controlled, as well as low-level mechanisms that implement those policies.
The common access control policies found in literature are Discretionary, Lattice-Based, and Mandatory Access Control (DAC, LBAC, and MAC respectively). DAC was formally introduced by Lampson [Lampson, 1971] , where essentially the owner of an object has discretion over what users were authorized to access that object. Access broadly refers to a particular mode of operation such as read or write. The owner is typically designated as the creator of an object, hence it is an actual user of the system. This is different from LBAC and MAC, which we will refer to collectively as MAC [Osborn et al., 2000] , where individual users have no discretion over object access. MAC [Bell and La-Padula, 1973 ] is primarily concerned with the flow of information, thereby enforcing restrictions on the direction of communication channels. For further discussion on access control policies, we refer interested readers to a survey by Sandhu [Sandhu and Samarati, 1994] .
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is an emerging area of study, and is actively pursued as an alternative to both DAC and MAC. In RBAC, individual users are assigned roles, and the access permissions of an object are also assigned to roles. Therefore the permissions assigned to a role are acquired by the members associated with it. This additional layer reduces the management of permissions, and supports the concepts of least privilege, separation of duties, and data abstraction. RBAC, and its associated components, are an instrument for expressing a policy, and not a policy by itself. For access-dependent viewing, we use a MAC policy embodied within an RBAC framework.
Collaborative Design
There is a vast body of past work on concurrent engineering and collaborative design. In our view, this research can be [loosely] grouped into two categories which we will call "data centric" and "interaction centric." Data centric research focuses on collaborative data sharing or knowledge sharing. Historically, research of this kind emerged simultaneously from the engineering, the artificial intelligence, and database communities. Interaction centric approaches deal with the real-time or asynchronous collaboration among people in the design process. This most frequently means real-time, collaborative, multi-user environments. Often these environments would be graphical, or 3D; in other cases, the environment consist of computer-supported cooperative work (CSCW) tools coupled with design systems. Much of the recent work in Collaborative Graphics falls into the latter category.
The subset of existing work most relevant to our efforts is interaction centric, dealing with real-time 3D collaboration and communication. Distributed Virtual Environments (DVEs) [Jayaram et al., 1999 , Eriksson, 1994 , Macedonia et al., 1994 have been developed for real-time interactions between distributed collaborators in a number of different domains. Immersive environments such as CAVE [Cruz-Neira et al., 1993] have been developed which also support real-time interaction, but they do not necessarily support collaborative CAD. [Conner et al., 1997] directly addressed the use of distributed VR for collaborative design, but in this work the design data was largely static and not worked on synchronously by multiple users. In each of these cases, the work employed large-scale virtual reality systems.
On the scale team design, where individual users collaborate using more typical computing hardware, empirical study is recently beginning to emerge. SHASTRA is an environment for collaborative visualization and shared multimedia, demonstrated mostly for scientific and medical applications [Anupam and Bajaj, 1993] . The DOME [Pahng et al., 1998 , Abrahamson et al., 2000 and FIPER [Rohl et al., 2000] systems target the integration of software products, and coordination between them over the network, for collaboration among individuals assigned disjoint duties in the product development cycle or across institutional boundaries. These systems support an access-control framework, but do not offer alternatives to the problem of "allor-nothing" feature suppression when a lack of full permissions exists.
Research efforts on level of detail (LOD) rendering [Hoppe, 1998 ], view dependent rendering [De Floriani et al., 2000] and 3D compression [Deering, 1995 , Taubin and Rossignac, 1998 , Gueziec et al., 1999 often mention the applicability of these techniques to collaborative design. To date, however, the main use of these efforts has been limited to areas such as streaming or transmitting 3D data over the Internet.
Multiresolution Techniques
Polygon meshes lend themselves to fast rendering algorithms, which are hardware-accelerated in most platforms. Many applications, including CAD, require highly detailed models to maintain a convincing level of realism. It is often necessary to provide LOD techniques in order to deliver real-time computer graphics and animations. Therefore, mesh simplification is adopted for efficient rendering, transmission, and various computations. The most common use of mesh simplification is to generate multiresolution models or various levels of detail (LOD). For example, closer objects are rendered with a higher LOD, and distant objects with a lower LOD. Thanks to LOD management, many applications such as CAD visualization can accelerate rendering and increase interactivity. The most recent survey on mesh simplification can be found in [Luebke, 2001] .
The most popular polygon-reduction technique is edge collapse or simply ecol (more generally, vertex merging or vertex pair contraction) where two vertices are collapsed into a single one. The issues in ecol include which vertices to merge in what order, where to place the resulting vertex, etc. Vertex split or simply vsplit is the inverse operation of ecol. Hoppe proposed progressive mesh (PM) [Hoppe, 1996] , which consists of a coarse base mesh (created by a sequence of ecol operations) and a sequence of vsplit operations. Applying a subset of vsplit operations to the base mesh creates an intermediate simplification.
The vsplit and ecol operations are known to be fast enough to apply at runtime, therefore supporting dynamic simplification.
Problem Formulation
In the context of 3D design, a model M is a description of an artifact, usually an individual part or assembly, in the form of a solid model. A collaborative engineering environment enables multiple engineers to simultaneously work with M. The engineers (designers, process engineers, etc) correspond to a set of actors A = {a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n }, each of which has associated with it a set of roles. Roles, R = {r 0 , r 1 , . . . , r m }, define access and interaction rights for the actors. For example, actor a 3 might have associated with it roles r 20 , r 23 , and r 75 -this entitles them to view (and perhaps change) portions of M associated with these roles. Portions of M not associated with these roles, however, might be "off limits" to actor a 3 . This paper focuses on the problem of role-based viewing of simultaneously shared models.
We formulate the problem of role-based viewing, depicted in Figure 1 , in the following subsections by developing:
Actor-Role Framework: a general RBAC framework for describing actors and roles within a collaborative-distributed design environment. This framework uses a hierarchical graph to capture role-role relationships and create a relation between actors and roles. Model-Role Framework: an associative mapping from roles to topological regions on models. These regions capture the security features, F, of a 3D model-relating how a point, patch, part, or sub-assembly can be viewed by actors with given roles. Role-Based Viewing: an algorithm to generate a role-based view given an actor a, his/her set of roles, a model M, and its set of security features. A role-based view is a tailored 3D model which is customized for actor a based on the roles defining a's access permissions on the model. In this way, the role-based view model does not compromise sensitive model information which a is not allowed to see (or see in detail). This is accomplished using a mesh simplification technique to generate the role-based view. 
Actor-Role Security Framework
Our security framework is based on an adaptation of rolebased access control, as developed in the information assurance and security literature [Sandhu et al., 1996] , to the collaborative design problem. We focus on the relation between actors, their roles and the solid model geometry. This is in contrast to other work on access control in collaborative CAD which has focused mainly on database synchronization/transaction issues [Bancilhon et al., 1985] .
Representing Actors and Roles
We define a hierarchical RBAC framework where:
1. Entities include a set of actors, A = {a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n } and a set of roles R = {r 0 , r 1 , . . . , r m }; An example of this RBAC framework is given in Figure 2 . For the remainder of this paper, we focus on read permission granted by a given set of roles. Rather than "all or nothing" read permissions, our objective is to assign a "degree of visibility" to features of a model based on an actor's roles. Using this formulation, we show how one can implement a Bell-La Padulabased [Bell and La-Padula, 1973 ] security model for collaborative viewing of CAD data. Example. Using the simple actor-role assignment matrix and role hierarchy from Figure 2 , we can compute the degree of visibility to each actor for a model assigned to a specific role. To implement the Bell-La Padula [Bell and La-Padula, 1973 ] model, we need to compute visibility in such a way as to guarantee that the role (e.g., security clearance) of someone receiving a piece of information must be at least as high as the role assigned to the information itself. In this way, a CAD model classified as "Secret" can only be viewed by those with a "Top-Secret" or 
Model-Role Security Framework
Let M be a solid model of an artifact (part, assembly, etc.) and let b(M) represent the boundary of M. In this context, the Model-Role Assignment, MR, is a relation (possibly many-tomany) assigning roles to points on the surface of the model: 
Role-Based Viewing
The issue now is that, for a given actor a, what portions of the model M that he/she can see will depend on their associated roles and the security features of the model. Depending on their permissions, a new model, M , must be generated from M such that the security features are not shown or obfuscated based on the actor's roles. If their roles give them permission to see certain features (i.e., mating features), then the resulting model includes the features with the same fidelity as in M; if not, the features must be obfuscated in such a way as to hide from a what a does not have the role to see. Hence, the role-based view generation problem can be stated as follows:
Problem Given a set of roles and their relationships (R and RH); a solid model and its security features (M, F, and MR); and an actor (a and AR), determine the appropriate view M of model M for actor a.
We propose a solution based on the use of multiresolution meshes, as follows:
1. Convert solid model M to a high-fidelity mesh representation; 2. Based on F, determine which facets belong to each security feature, f ; 3. For each security feature f , do: (a) If the intersection of actor a's roles and f 's roles is nonempty, then add the facets associated with f to M ; (b) If actor a's roles do not intersect the roles of f , determine (using RH) how much of f they are allowed to see and create a set of modified facets to represent f for inclusion in M .
4. Clean up the resulting M so that boundaries of the f i 's are topologically valid. 5. Return M .
There are three research problems we address:
1. How does the role-hierarchy RH relate to the degree of visibility?
We show how the weighted DAG that comprises RH can be used to implement a number of useful security policies by making the model quality a function of the "path cost" among roles in RH.
How to modify the facets for each f i based on RH?
Our approach is to use a security policy (based on Bell-La Padula) associated with the role hierarchy RH to determine how to modify the model. In some cases, policy will dictate degradation of the model fidelity; in other cases, the secu-rity features may be completely deleted or replaced with a simple convex hull or bounding box. To accomplish this, we employ multiresolution meshes: model fidelity will be preserved to the degree the actor's rights allow it. The result is a mesh appropriate for viewing by the actor a. 3. How to ensure that the resulting regions form a topologically valid model? Deforming the model feature by feature may result in topological regions of facets in M that are mis-aligned or aesthetically unpleasing. Cracks and occlusion can be avoided by preserving the boundary edges during simplification.
Example. This example shows a model M whose surface is described by one security feature f 0 . Given the role-hierarchy from Figure 3 , and four actors, a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , and a 3 with their AR shown in Figure 2 . Figure 5 shows the four different views of model M they each see. 
Technical Approach
We combine techniques from solid modeling and computer graphics to provide a secure collaborative environment which supports real-time design and manipulation of solid models. In this section we describe how we modify and configure RBAC to support our multiresolution security model. We describe problems and the algorithms employed. We further explain some optional techniques to augment the model.
Hierarchical RBAC Policy
Since RBAC is a means of articulating policy rather than a policy by itself, an actual policy is necessary. We wish to adopt a policy similar to the classical MAC model [Bell and La-Padula, 1973] . This is defined in terms of the following axioms using λ to return the security level of either an actor or a feature:
1. Simple Security Property -Actor a can read feature f iff λ (a) ≥ λ ( f ). This is also known as the read-down property.
2. Liberal * -Property Actor a can write feature f iff λ (a) ≤ λ ( f ). This is also known as the write-up property.
There are many variations of the * -property, but we will focus on the simple security property which essentially states that the clearance of a person receiving a piece of information must be at least as high as the classification of the object. Details on a formal construction of MAC in RBAC, as well as a correctness proof, have been presented by Osborn [Osborn et al., 2000] .
Hierarchical RBAC is a natural means for structuring roles that reflect an organization's lines of authority and responsibility [Sandhu et al., 1996] . The main distinction between our approach and the generic RBAC frameworks found in literature, is that we also allow permissions to be modified through the role hierarchy. Typically permissions (i.e., an object and a permissible operation) are associated with every combination of ob ject × role. Since our read permissions are specified by a degree of visibility value, an inheritance relation can further refine this value. An inheritance relation is a binary relation (parent, child), where the child inherits permissions from the parent based upon a multiplicative weight w. For instance: w = 1.0 preserves the parents permissions exactly, while w = 0.5 will reduce the degree of visibility by half for all inherited objects. By transitivity, this weighted factor applies to all inherited objects specified in the role hierarchy.
Intuitively, it might appear that we're breaking the simple security property by allowing some actors to view objects that they normally would not be able to see. This is not the case, and instead should be viewed as transforming one object into a new object that is permissible. Hence, our model still adheres to the simple security property.
Traditional access control systems (prior to RBAC) store each object and permissions using either an access matrix, an access control list (ACL), or a capability list. An access matrix is a two-dimensional grid where every user × ob ject combination is enumerated. This requires storage for every possibility, even though most of them will never be used. An access control list is defined as a set of objects associated with each user. In contrast, a capability list is defined as a set of users associated with each object. In our domain, an object is either a security feature f or an actor a. Since roles serve as an intermediary between actors and features, a different data structure needs to be devised using these ideas. Another alternative is to represent roles in a single list where both an actor list and security feature list is attached to each role. This is the most flexible approach, but requires more computation during the collaboration process to achieve.
We will need to determine all of the roles associated with each distinct security feature and actor in order to ensure a complete monitoring mechanism. Following user authentication, a query must be invoked to retrieve all of the roles associated with the given actor. This result can be stored for the lifetime of the actor's session, unless a runtime AR occurs. Consequently, every time a component/sub-assembly is loaded or an MR occurs in the current model, a query will be invoked to return all the roles associated with each security feature. A non-empty intersection between these roles, and the roles from the previous query, indicates that the actor has permission to view the model at the level of detail specified by the role. Since there will typically be more unique features than actors in a collaborative design session, we advocate using a hierarchical role structure that is similar to a capability list.
Given an actor (a) and a region ( f ), the test to determine if a has permissions on f is equivalent to computing graph reachability among all possible pairs of roles assigned to both a and f . We will use R a to denote the set of roles assigned to a, and R f for the set of roles assigned to f . If any role in R a is reachable from any other role in R f (i.e., there exists a path), then the sum of all weights along the path yields the degree of visibility for that path. We will use a reachability function to return the set of all roles reachable from a given role. This may reveal several paths, hence the resultant degree of visibility for a will be chosen as the maximum. We denote the function that returns the maximum degree of visibility for a on f as α(a, f ). The result of this function can be computed once, stored, and re-used until an existing role assignment (AA or MR) is modified.
Given the AR, RH, and MR assignments, we can derive the direct actor × f eature mappings. Figure 6 gives the direct mappings specified implicitly by the AR, RH, and MR given in Figures 2(a), 2(b) , and 5 respectively. The two assignments in the MR that are not shown are f 1 ∈ r 1 and f 2 ∈ r 2 . It is important to note that, similar to inheritance found in most object-oriented programming languages, a 0 cannot see f 1 or f 2 even though it is the base role for sub-roles r 1 , r 2 , and r 3 . Hence an inheritance relation allows a child to inherit the permissions of the parent, but nothing is implied in the other direction.
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Multiresolution and LOD
For secure regions, multiresolution techniques are employed to provide different levels of detail that are sufficiently secure since sensitive regions are degraded. Although the original (highest) resolution version of a model might be a breach for some actors, we believe lower resolution LODs will be sufficiently secure to transmit to those actors. In addition to purely geometric multiresolution techniques, Shyamsundar and Gadh have developed a framework for representing different levels of detail for geometric feature data [Shyamsundar and Gadh, 2001] . Our security model could be used in conjunction with this feature LOD representation, but an automatic simplification algorithm needs to be developed.
Mesh simplification techniques include either vertex decimation, vertex clustering, or edge contraction. Choosing a specific simplification technique among the breadth of candidates is application dependent. To address the demands of an interactive collaborative design environment, we outline several issues which are critical for simplification:
1. speed: As the number of component/sub-assemblies in a session increases, the simplification becomes the bottleneck. We need an algorithm capable of drastic simplification in the least amount of time. 2. dynamic: Dynamic simplification provides a continuous spectrum of detail so an appropriate model can be selected at runtime. We do not wish to store all possible LODs within the model repository. Therefore a dynamic simplification will be ideal. 3. non-topology preserving: Since we are interested in degrading fidelity instead of maintaining it, it will be less expensive to use an algorithm which does not maintain a model's topology. 4. boundary preserving: The boundary of objects should be preserved in order to distinguish objects from one another. Inadvertent occlusion and cracks may result if we relieve this constraint.
view-independence:
The viewer receives 3D model information therefore the simplification should also support this.
Given our requirements, Quadric Error Metrics [Garland and Heckbert, 1997] (QEM) is an obvious candidate. QEM provides drastic simplification, capable of progressivity, in the fastest amount of time. One issue is the algorithms dependence upon a threshold value. In the rare case that the threshold value is as large as the model itself, then the algorithm runs in O(n 2 ). An alternative approach is to compute an optimal threshold adaptively [Erikson and Manocha, 1999] .
We have proposed using an automatic simplification technique to degrade the fidelity of a model enough to satisfy the access-control requirements of a collaborative design session. In mission-critical situations, an automatic technique cannot be proven to sufficiently degrade the model enough to be secure in all environments. The process can be supplemented by adopting a form of user-guided simplification [Kho and Garland, 2003 ]. User-guided simplification is a means of supervising the simplification by editing the order of ecol performed during simplification, selecting regions where more or less simplification is necessary, or directly manipulating the vertex hierarchy. A side effect is that these simplification parameters need to be stored with the model, since these can not be automatically derived.
Topological Constraints
QEM simplification can be configured to either maintain or modify the topological genus of a model. In a multi-user CAD server, progressive meshes (PM) [Hoppe, 1996] are useful for the transmission of CAD models. If PM is used, and if the removal of holes yields a more secure version of a particular model, then genus-reduction techniques must be used since standard PM is not compatible with topology-modifying simplification.
Cracks and occlusion must be avoided for continuous and adjacent regions of a part that are simplified independently. If a single part is partitioned into two regions, and each region has a different model-role assignment, then the regions will be simplified at different levels of detail. If boundary edges of the mesh are not preserved, then possibly cracks and self-occlusion will result.
Implementation and Demonstration
To test the approach we have described in this paper, a prototype system was developed. For collaborative design, it is important for the system to be independent of the type of operating system. Previous iterations of our system were written in Java3D, but we found that it incurred too much overhead in general. Our revised system has been developed using OpenGL under Solaris 2.7 − 2.8, Windows, and Linux operating systems using either Mesa and nVidia's native OpenGL drivers.
The environment we developed is divided into two stages: authoring and viewing. The authoring stage allows a designer to assign a {label, permission}-tuple to parts, assemblies, or individual facets. The normalized permissions [0.0 − 1.0] were used to indicate a percentage of vertices in the original model. In situations where this is inadequate, a supervised technique, such as user-guided simplification can be used.
When a designer requests a model, they must declare their identity so their role associations can be derived. Based upon the roles associated with a designer and the model features, a rolebased view is generated. We used a single administrative account to modify permissions in the model repository. There are numerous administrative configurations which have been presented by Sandhu [Sandhu et al., 1999] . The goals and constraints of the collaboration will dictate how comprehensive the role administration requirements should be.
We have implemented our own topology-preserving QEMbased simplification algorithm. For the experiments in this paper, we chose to collapse only vertex pairs which are connected by an edge. The simplification algorithm is passed each tessellated and triangulated part, or connected region of a part with an equivalent {label, permission} set of tuples. Since these regions are disjoint, they can be simplified and transmitted in parallel.
Example: Motorcycle Engine There are three actors in this scenario: an outsourced engineer (a i ) that designs the internal components, another outsourced engineer (a e ) in charge of the casting and machining of the exterior components, and a supervisor (a o ). In this scenario, a i is designing the pistons, crankshaft, and connecting rods while a e is designing the engine block and gears. a o has full access to the model, and is in charge of providing the outsourced engineers with model information on a "need to know" basis. Figure 7 (a) shows a o 's view of the model in full resolution. Since a e is not allowed to see unnecessary details of the engine, the internal parts are hidden or displayed at a lower resolution. However, this engineer still needs access to the crankshaft because of its interaction with the gear, hence the crankshaft is also displayed in a lower resolution. a e 's role-based view is shown in Figure 7(b) . a i does not need detailed design information about the engine block or casing, so these are displayed at a lower resolution. Figure 7(c) shows the role-based view for a i .
Conclusions and Future Work
This paper developed a new technique, hierarchical rolebased viewing, for collaborative 3D assembly design. By incorporating security with collaborative design, the costs and risks incurred by multi-organizational collaboration can be reduced. Aside from digital 3D watermarking, research on how to provide security issues to distributed design, working in collaborative graphical environments, is largely non-existent. The authors believe that this work is the first of its kind in the field of collaborative CAD and engineering.
Both NURBS and implicit surfaces can be handled by tessellating the surfaces and using the techniques described in this paper. However, we are currently extending these techniques to handle B-spline surfaces directly. Crack prevention, permissions on patch boundaries when adjacent patches have different roles, and other issues will need to be addressed. We would also like to give a demonstration of the model on geometric, as well as semantic, feature data.
The largest motivation for handling B-splines is to show that for certain geometry, multiresolution surface techniques will provide a more intuitive simplification result. Figure 7 (c) depicts the outer casing of the engine after QEM-based mesh simplification. We believe that B-spline simplification techniques, based on wavelet decomposition, will produce a "cylinder-like" result for the outer casing. This result is more desirable in the context of role-based viewing.
Our environment is currently being extended to provide a multi-user collaborative CAD workspace. Optimal network configurations can be constructed, and "grouping" of the mesh hierarchy can be performed for actors and regions assigned similar roles. We can take advantage of continuous LOD over a network using a progressive technique, such as Progressive Meshes [Hoppe, 1996] . Multicast networks could also be used to properly reduce aggregate bandwidth when several designers have similar privileges.
